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Franco Fava

Jun 03 2024

The Case for Small Caps in a Declining Rate Environment

Dec 19 2023

Momentum: A Sword Without a Hilt

Momentum Performance – A First Look

Of the 4 most commonly used investment factors – market, size, value, and momentum1 – we’ve seen momentum produce the highest alpha by an absurdly wide margin. However, it has also proven to be the most dangerous factor.

The chart and table below summarize some key performance statistics for those big 4 financial factors2. There are immediately several noteworthy takeaways:

  • Momentum outperforms the other factors by multiple orders of magnitude.
  • Momentum is the most volatile factor by a substantial margin.
  • Momentum’s alpha – at 19.87% a year – feels ludicrously high.

Long-Short Factor Portfolios: Growth of $1

Source: Innealta uses monthly data between January 1927 and October 2023 from Kenneth R. French Data Library. Graph line-values are logarithmic base10, end-values are not. Factor Portfolio returns are not representative of actual portfolios and do not reflect costs and fees associated with an actual investment. Actual returns might be lower. Past Performance is no guarantee of future returns. Please refer to disclosures for further information. For illustrative and comparative purposes only.

Table 1. Factor Performance Statistics

Factor Growth of $1 Average Return CAGR Volatility Beta Alpha (Annualized)
Momentum $7,057 13.75% 9.58% 27% -0.55 19.87%
Market $419 7.97% 6.43% 19% 1.00 0.00
Size $5 2.24% 1.67% 11% 0.19 0.15%
Value $26 4.12% 3.44% 12% 0.15 2.40%

Source: Innealta uses monthly data between January 1927 and October 2023 from Kenneth R. French Data Library. Factor Portfolio returns are not representative of actual portfolios and do not reflect costs and fees associated with an actual investment. Actual returns might be lower. Summary table values show returns gross of fees and annualized. Past Performance is no guarantee of future returns. Please refer to disclosures for further information. For illustrative and comparative purposes only.

The Dark Side of Momentum

After the quick analysis above, one might conclude that momentum is the most dominant factor: sure, it appears to have a bit higher volatility, but with returns that high, a little extra volatility could be an acceptable price to pay. Unfortunately, looking just at volatility alone doesn’t really convey the true dangers that momentum investors may face.

The momentum factor occasionally experiences extremely severe and prolonged drawdowns – devastating to such an extent that they’ve earned the nickname of “momentum crashes3”. The two most notable instances stand out for their severity and length: during the Great Depression, momentum suffered a drawdown exceeding 95%, and following the Great Financial Crisis, it experienced a drawdown of 81%.

Cumulative Wealth: Post-Great Depression

Cumulative Wealth: Post-Great Financial Crisis



Source: Innealta uses monthly data between June 1932 and December 1939 from Kenneth R. French Data Library. Factor Portfolio returns are not representative of actual portfolios and do not reflect costs and fees associated with an actual investment. Actual returns might be lower. Past Performance is no guarantee of future returns. Please refer to disclosures for further information. For illustrative and comparative purposes only.

Source: Innealta uses monthly data between March 2009 and March 2013 from Kenneth R. French Data Library. Factor Portfolio returns are not representative of actual portfolios and do not reflect costs and fees associated with an actual investment. Actual returns might be lower. Past Performance is no guarantee of future returns. Please refer to disclosures for further information. For illustrative and comparative purposes only.

 


 

These are life-altering crashes for investors who withdraw their money near the bottom and career-ruining for those individuals managing other people’s money. We know that risk and return are intrinsically related, so momentum’s high long-term return potential now seems more appropriate given the price one pays to get there: extended periods of devastating losses.

Momentum as a standalone investment strategy could result in catastrophic outcomes, but what if it was used as a tool within a broader investment strategy: would you then be able to harness some of its benefits and mitigate the likelihood of experiencing the devastations seen above? To do this, we need to first understand why it crashes in the first place.

So why does momentum crash?

Taking a look under the hood to see how the momentum factor is constructed allows us to better understand why momentum tends to crash following periods of prolonged market downturns.

The momentum factor is just a dollar-neutral long/short portfolio: the long portion is a basket of securities that have had the strongest returns over the prior 12 months (excluding the most recent month) and the short component is a basket of securities with the worst returns in the prior 12 months (excluding the most recent month)4. A consequence of this methodology is that the momentum factor tends to have much higher turnover than its peers, and this high turnover results in portfolio characteristics that are quite dynamic – most notably, its beta.

When you plot the rolling betas for the components of the momentum factor during any of the excessive draw-down periods, the crash narrative is clear:

  1. The overall market experiences a prolonged drawdown.
  2. The prolonged market downturn causes a mechanical shift in momentum portfolios:
    • The long side buys stocks that have held up relatively okay during the downturn (low-beta stocks).
    • The short side sells stocks that have been especially beaten down during the downturn (high-beta stocks).
    • Net Result: A portfolio with a significantly negative beta.
  3. The market – which has severely overreacted to the downside – shoots upward rapidly: the short-side of the portfolio is absolutely killed.

Below we depict this evolution during the GFC, but a similar pattern emerges if you look at the post-depression crash as well. Our primary observation is that the worst periods for momentum are during sharp melt-ups, which have been preceded by a prolonged market downturn.

Rolling Betas: Post-GFC Period

Source: Rolling beta is calculated as the trailing, 6-month beta of the portfolio against the market factor. Using daily data from the Kenneth R. French Data Library. The long side is represented as the portfolio of stocks in the upper 10% of return. The short side is represented as the portfolio of stocks in the bottom 10% of return. The Momentum Factor portfolio is constructed as the long side minus the short side. For illustrative and comparative purposes only.

Managing Momentum: Practical Tips for a Balanced Portfolio

What does all of this tell us: is momentum too dangerous a factor to use in managing portfolios? We think not. You just need to be thoughtful about how you incorporate momentum into the portfolio construction process. Some general tips for the safe use of momentum:

  • Risk management is key. Even more so than with other factors, keeping a close eye on how portfolio risk is evolving is crucial:
    • Be mindful of the portfolio’s beta relative to its benchmark, especially during periods of prolonged market drawdowns.
    • Scale down momentum exposure in periods of heightened volatility, and scale it up during periods of lower volatility.
  • Use multiple signals for momentum. The traditional factor is based on 12-1 returns for relative stock ranking, but incorporating elements of time-series momentum and a variety of different lookback windows can result in a more robust signal.
  • Combining momentum with other, low-correlated factors like value or profitability is also likely to reduce the portfolio’s crash risk.
  • Avoid shorting stocks based on momentum signals. Most of the pain experienced in crashes is driven by the short side of the momentum portfolio. While you are giving up long-term return potential by forgoing this leg of the premium, the diminished chance of devastating losses is likely an acceptable tradeoff for most.

Ultimately, we believe momentum is a powerful tool for enhancing portfolio returns, but it must be carefully applied and can cause devastating damage if used without due care and respect.

 


 
[1] When we say momentum, we are referring to “cross-sectional momentum”, which ranks stocks relative to each other, in contrast to “time-series momentum” which ranks stocks relative to their own history. Additionally, the momentum factor we depict is constructed by subtracting the bottom decile of loser stocks from the top decile of winner stocks. Some constructions of the momentum factor opt for less extreme breakpoints such as 30/70 percentiles.
[2] Note that the Y-Axis is log-scaled in the chart. This adjustment is necessary because the magnitude of momentum’s outperformance is so ridiculously large the chart looks silly on a normal scale.
[3] For an in-depth treatment of the entire momentum crash phenomenon and how it can be handled see Momentum Crashes. This entire blogpost draws heavily on the insights from this paper.
[4] This is a minor simplification, for the complete definition see Ken French Data Library Momentum Factor.
 


 

IMPORTANT NOTES

This material is for informational purposes and is intended to be used for educational and illustrative purposes only. It is not designed to cover every aspect of the relevant markets and is not intended to be used as a general guide to investing or as a source of any specific investment recommendation. It is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument, investment product or service. This material does not constitute investment advice, nor is it a substitute for such professional advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Innealta does not provide tax, legal, insurance, or accounting advice. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified professional adviser. In preparing this material we have relied upon data supplied to us by third parties. The information has been compiled from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made by Innealta Capital, LLC as to its accuracy, completeness or correctness. Material contains opinions, estimates and projections of Innealta and are subject to change without notice. Any projections, forecasts, estimates, and forward-looking statements contained herein are necessarily speculative in nature and are based upon certain assumptions. It can be expected that some or all of such assumptions will not materialize or will vary significantly from actual results. Accordingly, any projections are only estimates and actual results will differ and may vary substantially from the projections or estimates shown.

Factor premiums are measured as follows:

Market: Market return over the risk-free rate. Size: Smaller market capitalization companies over larger market capitalization companies. Value: Lower relative price companies over higher relative price companies. Profitability: More profitable companies over less profitable companies. Investment: Conservative company investment over aggressive company investment. Momentum: Higher prior return companies over lower prior return companies. For more details on the factor indices and premiums represented on this brochure, please refer to the Kenneth R. French Data Library.

3429-INN-12/19/2023

Nov 13 2023

Valuation: A Tale of One Metric

If you can only choose one metric to use when making investment allocation decisions, what would it be?

Our answer is valuation. Why?

  • Intuition: all else equal, you should prefer to pay less for the earning power of two similar companies.
  • Theoretical justification: most fundamental valuation metrics serve as a reliable proxy for a more complete valuation analysis such as a full-blown discounted cash flow model.
  • Empirical evidence: valuation has been shown – through countless academic and practitioner studies – to be highly predictive of future stock returns.
  • Persistence: we have a high degree of confidence that valuation will continue to serve as a valuable tool for predicting returns; investors will continue to overpay for glamorous, “hot” stocks, and underappreciate the gains to holding a diversified bucket of “cheap” stocks.

Obviously, valuation is not the only variable worth utilizing for portfolio construction, but it does get you surprisingly far in terms of explaining returns on its own. So which valuation metric is “best”: P/B, P/CF, P/E? The short answer is that it doesn’t matter all that much because you often end up with similar results.

That said, how does the US equity landscape look today from a valuation perspective? Since we are only considering one metric, we want to examine it from every possible angle to squeeze as much insight out of it as possible.

P/B: Current vs Historical Percentile

P/B: Historical Avg. vs Current as a % of Historical Avg.




Source: Innealta Capital using data from Bloomberg. Time is from 06/01/2000 to 10/31/2023. Please refer to disclosures for full definitions.

After examining a variety of data points, derived from P/B, across the Russell Style Box universe, there are a handful of facts we find noteworthy (see table in appendix for full data overview):

  • Currently, small cap value is the cheapest (P/B of 1.16x) and large growth is the most expensive (P/B of 10.98x).
  • Small cap value has been the cheapest for most of the past two decades – not surprising since this is almost guaranteed by construction of the indexes. (More on this later)
  • Small caps – across all styles – have experienced the most pronounced decrease in valuation over the past year relative to other market cap segments.
  • Currently, small value is priced at around 78% of its historical average and large growth is priced at 187% of its historical average.
  • Relative to their own history, small cap value stocks are priced extremely cheap (7th percentile) and large growth is price extremely expensive (92nd percentile).

Our primary takeaway: small-cap value is cheap and has been getting cheaper while large growth is expensive and has been getting more expensive.

As mentioned above, it’s not surprising that small value is cheaper than large growth at any point in time: the indexes are literally constructed to make this the case. The more informative observation is to examine how the ratio of relative expensiveness has changed over time. The below chart shows the ratio of the P/B of large growth to the P/B of small value, often termed the value spread.

 

Value Spread: LCG vs SCV

Source: Innealta Capital using data from Bloomberg. Time frame is from 06/01/2000 to 10/31/2023. LCG refers to Large Cap Growth category; SCV refers to Small Cap Value category. Please refer to disclosures for full definitions.

 

Clearly the value spread is at extreme levels: currently sitting at the 99th percentile relative to its history. To a certain extent, it is justifiable to pay more for growth stocks than value stocks – as they are expected to grow their earnings more than value stocks in the future – but we believe paying for large growth stocks at these prices would require investors to be quite confident that their earnings will continue to grow at an ever-accelerating pace.

So why, if valuation is such a strong predictor of future returns as we claim, isn’t everyone trimming their exposure to large growth stocks and allocating more to small value? Some of the common reasons we’ve heard from investors and financial media include:

  1. The rise of technology: value investing doesn’t work with the rapid growth of intangible assets.
  2. Higher interest rates will disproportionately hurt smaller companies compared to larger ones. (Ironically, low interest rates was previously a reason put forth until recently).
  3. An increasingly likely economic downturn in the near future will hurt small caps more than large caps.
  4. The Mega Cap companies are competitively positioned to capture greater and greater amounts of market share and drive economic growth for the foreseeable future.

Some of the arguments above may in fact have played a role in the under-performance of small cap value over the last decade, but some – such as sensitivity to interest rates and economic downturns – are simply not supported by the data. Regardless of one’s specific belief about any of these arguments, it is hard to make a case that their impact is sufficient to justify a value spread at the 99th percentile. Our view is that small-cap value stocks are priced extremely attractively right now and that it is likely that overweighting small-cap value will generate strong excess returns going forward. Unfortunately, we do not know precisely when the regime shift will occur, but history has shown the spread can revert rapidly and we aim to position our portfolios in a manner to take advantage of the regime shift.

 


 

Appendix

Source: Innealta Capital using data from Bloomberg. Time is from 06/01/2000 to 10/31/2023. Please refer to disclosures for full definitions.

 


 

IMPORTANT NOTES

This material is for informational purposes and is intended to be used for educational and illustrative purposes only. It is not designed to cover every aspect of the relevant markets and is not intended to be used as a general guide to investing or as a source of any specific investment recommendation. It is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument, investment product or service. This material does not constitute investment advice, nor is it a substitute for such professional advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified professional adviser. In preparing this material we have relied upon data supplied to us by third parties. The information has been compiled from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made by Innealta Capital, LLC as to its accuracy, completeness or correctness. Innealta Capital, LLC does not guarantee that the information supplied is accurate, complete, or timely, or make any warranties with regard to the results obtained from its use. Innealta Capital, LLC has no obligations to update any such information.

The information provided herein, including, without limitation, investment strategies, investment restrictions and parameters, allocation methodologies, and investment and other personnel, may be modified, terminated, or supplemented at any time without further notice in a manner which we believe is consistent with its overall investment objective. Charts and graphs included herein are created by Innealta for illustrative purposes only. There are no guarantees that a portfolio will reflect the allocations and exposures presented.

There is no guarantee that any investment process described herein will be successful or profitable. No investment strategy or risk management technique can guarantee returns or eliminate risk in any market environment. Clients and investors may lose all of their investments.

Analytics are presented for informational purposes only and do not constitute an offer or recommendation to buy or sell securities or to engage an investment manager. Market indices included are a general source of information and may not be the designated benchmark to evaluate an investment’s performance. Such benchmarks and market indices are unmanaged, assume reinvestment of income, do not reflect the impact of any trading commissions and costs, management, and incentive fees, and have limitations when used for comparison or other purposes because they, among other reasons, may have a different trading strategy, volatility, credit, or other material characteristics (such as limitations on the number and types of securities or instruments). No representation is made that any benchmark or index is an appropriate measure of comparison. Market Indices included are a general source of information and comparison to an index does not imply that the strategy will be constructed in the same way as the index or achieve returns, volatility, or other results similar to the index. Potential or current investors should not conclude that the strategy will or will not be correlated with any such index (including those purporting to represent the trading strategies to be implemented by such product). Potential or current investors should not consider any comparative index shown in this document to be a performance benchmark for the strategy. The comparison of indices in general, and to individual managed products in particular, are subject to material inherent limitations, and it is not possible to invest directly into an index.

Investing involves risk, principal loss is possible, and there can be no assurance that investment objectives will be achieved. Past performance is not indicative of future results and actual returns may vary materially and adversely. Therefore, no current or prospective client should assume that the future performance of any specific investment or investment strategy (including the investments and/or investment strategies recommended by Innealta Capital, LLC), will be profitable or equal to past performance levels. This presentation may contain forward-looking statements and projections that are based on the current beliefs and assumptions of Innealta Capital, LLC and on information currently available that Innealta Capital, LLC believes to be reasonable, however, such statements necessarily involve risks, uncertainties and assumptions, and prospective and current clients may not put undue reliance on any of these statements. Exchange traded funds (ETFs) are subject to risks similar to those of stocks, such as market risk, and investors who have their funds invested in accordance with the portfolios may experience losses. The principal risks of investing in a strategy of Innealta include, but are not limited to, loss of all or a substantial portion of the investment due to leveraging, short-selling, or other speculative practices, market fluctuations, risks associated with the operations, personnel, and processes of the manager, and risks with regard to cybersecurity. For more information on the risks associated with investment in ETFs, please refer to the Innealta Capital, LLC Form ADV Part 2, available at adviserinfo.sec.gov or upon request.

Index Definitions: The Russell 2000 Value TR Index measures the performance of Russell 2000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower forecasted growth values. The Russell 2000 Growth TR Index measures the performance of the Russell 2000 companies with higher price-to-book ratios and forecasted growth values. The Russell 2000 TR Index measures the performance of the small-cap segment of the US equity universe. It is a subset of the Russell 3000 Index representing approximately 7% of the total market capitalization of that index. The Russell 1000 Value TR Index is composed of large- and mid-capitalization U.S. equities that exhibit value characteristics. The Russell 1000 Growth Index is composed of large- and mid-capitalization U.S. equities that exhibit growth characteristics. The Russell 1000 TR Index measures the performance of the large-cap segment of the US equity universe. It includes approximately 1,000 largest US stocks, representing 93% of investable US equities by market capitalization. The Russell Mid-Cap TR Index measures the performance of the 800 smallest companies in the Russell 1000 Index, which represents approximately 25% of the total market capitalization of the Russell 1000 Index. The Russell Mid-Cap Value TR Index measures the performance of the mid-cap value segment of the US equity universe. It includes those Russell Mid-Cap Index companies with relatively lower price-to-book ratios. The Russell Mid-Cap Growth TR Index measures the performance of the mid-cap value segment of the US equity universe. It includes those Russell Mid-Cap Index companies with relatively lower price-to-book ratios. Total return indexes reinvest dividends.

Category Definitions: Small Cap Value refers to the Russell 2000 Value TR Index. Small Cap Blend refers to the Russell 2000 TR Index. Small Cap Growth refers to the Russell 2000 Growth TR Index. Large Cap Value refers to the Russell 1000 Value TR Index. Large Cap Blend refers to the Russell 1000 TR Index. Large Cap Growth refers to the Russell 1000 Growth Index. Mid Cap Value refers to the Russell Mid-Cap Value Index. Mid Cap Blend refers to the Russell Mid-Cap Index. Mid Cap Growth refers to the Russell Mid-Cap Growth Index.

3415-INN-11/14/2023

Nov 07 2023

A Look at the Rise of Stock-Bond Correlations

2022: When Diversification Failed

With stocks1 returning -19.21% and bonds2 returning -13.01%, 2022 was a rough year for most investors. The 60/40 portfolio, which is commonly thought of as the average investors’ portfolio, returned -16.73%; it’s second-worst year over the last three decades. Notably, 2022 was the only year where both stocks and bonds simultaneously had negative returns.

Figure 1 – Yearly Stock & Bond Performance

Source: Innealta Capital using data from Bloomberg. Time is from 1989-01-01 to 2023-10-31. Stocks refers to Russell 3000 TR Index. Bonds refers to the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond TR Index. Please see disclosures for full index definitions. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

 

Shifting Correlations

Investors have historically relied upon the negative correlation between stocks and bonds to protect their portfolios when one of the asset classes has a drawdown, but many are beginning to question the assumption that stocks and bonds truly act as portfolio diversifiers to each other.

We can begin to investigate the evolution of stock-bond correlations by plotting the rolling, 1-year correlation between stocks and bonds over the past few decades:

Figure 2 – Rolling, 1-Year Stock & Bond Correlations

Source: Innealta Capital using data from Bloomberg. Time is from 1989-01-01 to 2023-10-31. Stocks refers to Russell 3000 TR Index. Bonds refers to the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond TR Index. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

 

A few quick takeaways are immediately apparent:

  • Stock and bond correlations are not stable over time.
  • Shifts in correlation can be dramatic and swift.
  • The past 2 years have seen a steady upward trend in stock and bond correlations.
  • The current level (.20), while high relative to the past 2 decades, is not as high as the levels reached in prior peaks.

The current year also stands out for two reasons: it contains the highest ever inter-month, stock-bond correlation reading (.85 during the month of July) and 2023 has exhibited the most correlation volatility3 of any year in the dataset. (see appendix).

Figure 3 – 2023 Inter-Month Correlation

Source: Innealta Capital using data from Bloomberg. Inter-month correlation refers to the daily correlation of the Russell 3000 TR Index and the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond TR Index for the indicated month. (See appendix Table 1 for summary statistics of all years going back to 1989). Past performance is not indicative of future results.

 

Correlation Drivers

The obvious next questions are: What is driving the correlation upward? Why is this regime shift so volatile? Will it remain elevated – perhaps even continue to trend upwards?

Numerous studies4 undertaken by researchers and industry practitioners have explored the fundamental drivers between stock-bond correlations. The primary takeaway from each study is that there are several recurrent macro factors which have historically helped explain changes in stock-bond correlations. We re-tested several of these stated macro factors ourselves and below summarize some of the most impactful variables for explaining the monthly stock-bond correlation reading by outputting the correlation of the inter-month stock-bond correlation (SBC) with several factors:

Table 1 – Macro Factors Relationship to Stock Bond Correlation (SBC)

Factor Effect on Stock-Bond Correlation Variable Utilized Correlation to Stock-Bond-Correlation
Level of Inflation ↑ Trailing YoY% CPI 0.31
Change in Real Interest Rates ↑ MoM change in 10-year TIPs 0.39
Unemployment ↓ U3 Unemployment rate -0.16
Equity Volatility ↓ Trailing 12m Equity Volatility -0.32
Level of Interest Rates ↑ Average Level of 10-Year During Month 0.61
Source: Innealta Capital using data from Bloomberg. Inter-month correlation refers to the daily correlation of the Russell 3000 TR Index and the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond TR Index for the indicated month. (See appendix Table 1 for summary statistics of all years going back to 1989). Past performance is not indicative of future results.

 

Looking Ahead

The relationships above help show which factors explain correlation in the same period, but of more practical relevance is determining what we can expect going forward. Because those macro-variables are not known until after the fact, they cannot aid us in forming current predictions about the future, unless we concurrently formulate predictions about the relevant macro variables.

Fortunately, historical data has shown that near-term stock-bond correlations can be predicted reasonably well using a simple model: predict that next month’s correlation will be equal to the month that just ended. Stock-bond correlation tends to exhibit a high-degree of autocorrelation and stickiness so a sensible default option is to use the current value as our baseline forecast. The below scatterplot depicts a fitted regression equation which uses the current-month’s correlation as the only input to forecasting next months value:

Figure 4 – Basic Correlation Prediction Model

Source: Innealta Capital using data from Bloomberg. Time is from 1989-01-01 to 2023-10-31. Stocks refers to Russell 3000 TR Index. Bonds refers to the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond TR Index. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

 

Taking above into account our view is that stock-bond correlations are likely to remain in elevated territory for roughly the next 12-months, but as inflation and inflation uncertainty continue to decline, the stock-bond correlation will drift back to lower levels.

Portfolio Takeaways

What are the consequences of this view?

While we believe diversification is a critical element to any investment strategy, 2022 was a good reminder that diversification doesn’t always work over the short-term. In today’s environment of elevated correlations, investors with stock-bond portfolios may have to assume more risk to maintain a consistent level of expected return. While it is always prudent to look to other regions and asset classes to provide added diversification, it is increasingly important in times like these. That said, not all alternatives – commodities, real estate, etc. – are created equally and should be evaluated based on their role within the portfolio.

It’s worth noting that the performance of the classic 60/40 portfolio in 2022 was well within the range of outcomes and that the long-term outlook for stocks and bonds has not radically changed. Investors should be careful not to extrapolate recent trends too far into the future and overreact with any dramatic portfolio changes.

Appendix

Table 2: Inter-Month Stock Bond Correlation Stats Summarized by Year

Source: Innealta Capital using data from Bloomberg. Time is from 1989-01-01 to 2023-10-31. Stocks refers to Russell 3000 TR Index. Bonds refers to the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond TR Index. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

IMPORTANT NOTES

[1] Stock represented with the Rusell 3000 TR Index
[2] Bonds represented with the Bloomberg US Agg TR Index
[3] Volatility of correlation regimes is judged using the standard deviation of inter-month correlations
[4] A Changing Stock-Bond Correlation (aqr.com); The stock/bond correlation amid rising inflation: Increasing, but hardly a regime change (nl.vanguard); Empirical evidence on the stock-bond correlation

This material is for informational purposes and is intended to be used for educational and illustrative purposes only. It is not designed to cover every aspect of the relevant markets and is not intended to be used as a general guide to investing or as a source of any specific investment recommendation. It is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument, investment product or service. This material does not constitute investment advice, nor is it a substitute for such professional advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified professional adviser. In preparing this material we have relied upon data supplied to us by third parties. The information has been compiled from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made by Innealta Capital, LLC as to its accuracy, completeness or correctness. Innealta Capital, LLC does not guarantee that the information supplied is accurate, complete, or timely, or make any warranties with regard to the results obtained from its use. Innealta Capital, LLC has no obligations to update any such information. Past performance is not indicative of future results. All investments involve risk and unless otherwise stated, are not guaranteed. Be sure to consult with a tax professional before implementing any investment strategy.

Table 1 – Stock-bond correlation is the inter-month correlation between the Russell 3000 TR Index and the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Total Return Index. Level of inflation refers to the trailing, year of year % change in the CPI, start date of 1/31/1989. Change in Real Interest Rates refers to the month over month gross change in the 10-year TIPs, start date of 2/28/2003. Unemployment refers to the U3 unemployment rate, start date of 1/31/1989. Equity volatility refers to the trailing 12-month, daily standard deviation of the Russell 3000 TR Index start date of 12/31/1989. Level of interest rates refers to the average level of the 10-year, US Treasury interest rate, start date of 1/31/1989. All variables aside from equity volatility were sourced from the St. Louis Federal Reserve (FRED)

Index Definitions: The Russell 3000 Value TR Index measures the performance of the largest 3,000 U.S. companies representing approximately 96% of the investable U.S. equity market, as of the most recent reconstitution. The Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond TR Index is representative of the entire universe of taxable fixed-income investments. It includes issues of the U.S. Government and any agency thereof, corporate issues of investment grade quality (Baa/BBB or better), and mortgage-backed securities.

3423-INN-12/06/2023

Mar 31 2023

Insight Spotlight – Is Value Back?

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Advisory Services are offered through Innealta Capital, LLC, an Investment Adviser registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Registration does not imply a certain level of skill or training. No federal or state agency or regulatory or self-regulatory authority has approved the information contained in this website, and any representation to the contrary is unlawful. A copy of our Form ADV Part 2 is available below. Innealta Capital, LLC’s website and its associated links offer news, commentary, and generalized research, not personalized investment advice. All investments involve risk and unless otherwise stated, are not guaranteed. Be sure to consult with a tax professional before implementing any investment strategy. This website and articles contained herein may contain testimonials from current or former clients, or endorsements from other persons that are supporting or recommending the activities of the Firm. Such individuals may be compensated directly or indirectly by the Firm for the use of their statements. The statements represent the testimony or endorsement by that individual only and may not represent the experience of all counterparties.

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